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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN iDECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF HE UNITED STATES.1
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.1
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.3
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. 4
ACTION.
T1reate* l etters--Padiny.--. Threats of bodily hurt which occa-
ion such interruption or inconvenience as to produce pecuniary damage,
are actionable. . A mere vain fear is not sufficient; -it must be founded
upon an adequate threat. A count which only alleges that the defend-
ant threatened the plaintiff witt great injury, without any allegation of
accompanying circumstances known to the defendant, which would ren-
der the plaintiff less able to withstand such threat than persons of ordi-
nary firmness, is not sufficient: Grimes v. Gates et vx., 46 Vt.
A count which alleges that the defendant, intending to frighten, ter-
rify and injure the plaintiff, threatened to imprison the plaintiff, or to
cause the plaintiff to be imprtsofied,'and that by means thereof the
plaintiff was frightened, terrified and made sick, and rendered unable to
attend to her usual business, and perform her usual work, and was thereby
put to great expense, and made to suffer loss, is sufficient: Id.
In case for threats made by letter, it is not necessary to set out the
words in which the threats were made, but only the substance of the
threat: Id.
ADMImALTY.
Coisioyi-A steamer condemned for a collision with a sailing-vessel,
the wheelsman,'mate, captain and'other witnesses on the sailing-vessel
swearing positively to courses and distances and times immediately prior
to the collision, and these showing that the steamer was in fault; while
though there was strong evidence on the steamer's side to show that
these courses, distances, and times could not have been truly stated by
the witnesses in behalf of the sailing-vessel, this evidence was inferen-
tial chiefly; consisting of conclusions or arguments drawn from other
ficts sworn to, as ex. gr., the lights which the steamer saw and the'lights
which she did not see on the sailing-vessel ; and the effect of giving cre-dence to this inferential or argumentative testimony being to convict as
of necessity the witnesses for the sailing-vessel of perjury: Tw Wettona,
19 Wall.
Colision-Total Loss.-A steamer running at the rate of from eight
to ten knots an hour, on a bright moonlight night, in an open bay, with
nothing to mislead her, condemned for the loss of a schooner sailing
with a six-knot breeze, whose only fault was alleged to be a false ma-
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 19 of his Reports.
I From Hon. M. M. Granger, Reporter; to appear in 24 Ohio State Reports.
8 From J. W. Powell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 46 Vermont Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. M. Conorer, Reporter; to appear in 34 Wisconsin Reports.
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nmuvre iii the moment of impending collision. The court declares it to
have been the " duty of the steamer to see the schooner as soon as she
could be seen, to watch her progress and direction, to take into account
all the circumstances of the situation, and i so to govern herself as to
guard against peril to either vessel :" Te .7,alcon, 19 Wall:
Where the libel alleged that the loss by the collision was substantially
a total loss, and the answer substantially admitted this-the vessel hay-
ing sunk in Chesapeake Bay in five fathoms water, and it being clear
from the proofs that she could not have been repaired without a large
expenditure of time and money-hed, that the fhct that she was finally
raised, repaired, and put in good condition,! was no defence to a claim
for a total loss ;--especially as it did not appear at whose instance or
at what cost this was done; nor by what right those in possession of her
held.her; and it not being either alleged or proved that.she..bad .been.
tendered back to her original owners. The case distinguished from Th7e
Baltimore (8 Wallace 378) : Id.
But this decree for a total loss declared to bar any claim to the schooner
by her former owners, and that their title should be remitted to the
owners of the steamer: Jo.
Collision-Mutual Fault-Disiegard of Nautical .Rules.-A collision
occurred in a very dense fog between a sailing-bark and a large steamer,
about two hundred miles from Sandy Hook, and therefore in the track
of inward and outward bound vessels. The bark was under way moving
slowly, and at about the rate of a mile an hour, and was ringing a bell as
a fog signal. The steamer was going at the rate of seven knots an hour:
Held, That the damages were to be equally divided between the two
vessels, as, being both in fault, the steamer in moving in such a place
at so rapid a rate in so dense a fog, the bark for her violation of the
Act of Congress for preventing collisions at sea (identical in this res-
pect with the British Merchants' Shipping Act), which requires, in its
"Rules concerning Fog Signals," that "siling-vessels under way shall
use a foghorn," and "wh e n not underway shall use a bell:" The Penn-
sylvania, 19 Wall.
Although, if it clearly appears that a fault committed by a vessel has
had nothing to do with a disaster which has occurred, the liability for
damages is against the vessel alone which has producd the disaster,
still where a vessel has committed a positive breach of statute she must
show not only that probably her fault did not contribute to the disaster,
but that certainly it did not; that it could not have done so. In this
case, therefore, Congress having made, the use of a foghorn obligatory
on sailing-vessels under way in a fog,'it was declared to be out of place
to go into an inquiry whether, in fact, a bell gave notice to the steamer
that the bark was where she was as soon as a foghorn would have done:
Id.
AGENT. See Insurance.
AMENDMENT.
Cannot change Cause of Action or Nature of Defence.-It is the settled
rule in this state, that a party cannot, by amendment of lis~pleading before
trial, change the whole nature of his cause of action or ground of de-
fence; and in particular, that plaintiff cannot under the form of an amend-
" 646
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. 647
ment of his complaint before trial, change the action from one in tort to
one on contract, or the reverse: Supervisors of Kewaunee Co. v. Decker,
34 Wis.
An order refusing to strike an amended complaint from the files is ap-
pealable; and in this case, the amendment being of the character above
stated, such an order is reversed: Id.
AUCTION.
." Positive ale-B--raud.-Where a "sale" at auction is announced to
be "positive," it is an act of fraud on the part of the vendor, or his
agent, to employ by-bidders to keep up the price for his own benefit:
Wa&l v. Barton, 24 Ohio St.
BiLLS AND NOTES.
Defence of Want of Consideration.-The defence that a note sued on
,mis without consideration, or 'that the maker, when he gave it, was
under a mistake as to the fact or amount of an indebtedness supposed
to be due from him to the payee (fot which it was given), ought to be
sustained by evidence which leaves no reasonable doubt: 'unch v. WMz-
iams,34 Wis.
COSTS.
Objection to Taxation of-Allowance of Lump Sum by the Court as a
(Joditionfor a Continuance.-Objections to the taxation of costs at the
Circuit must in all cases be first taken before the taxing officer, or they
cannot be heard here: Hawkins and Others v. Mhe Northwestern Union
Railway Co., 34 Wis.
On granting defendant a continuance (fbr the absence of witnesses),
it was within the sound discretion of the Circuit Court to require, as a
condition thereof, payment of a 'ross sum as costs and disbursements
inoident to the preparation of the cause for trial at the pending term,
such sum not being exorbitant or unreasonable; and on appeal from
such order defendant cannot object to specific items allowed and taxed
by the clerk for attendance and mileage' of witnesses, on the ground
that the plaintiffs' affidavits in relations thereto were defective : Id.
COVENANT.
Running with the Land-Fence.-Where it is stipulated in-a deed-
poll that the grantee, his heirs and assigns, shall build and perpetually
maintain a fence on the line between the land granted and other lands
owned by the grantor, and the parties .to such deed, at the time of its
execution, contemplate the subdivision of the granted premises into
building or-town lots, and'their subsequent sale, the burden of maintain-
ing such fenice will not attach to, or run with, lots which do not abut on
the line 6f the proposed fence: Welsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Ptyment of Antecedent Debt by Promiso2y Note-Collateral Security.
-The plaintiff and H. signed a note with K. as his sureties, at which
time K. gave the plaintiff a note against the defendant, payable to K.
or bearer, as 'indemnity. Said last-mentioned note was accommodation
paper as between K. and the defendant; but the plaintiff had no know-
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ledge of it. K. subsequently became insolvent, and all his property
was divided pro rata among his creditors, making a dividend of thirty-
five per cent. The plaintiff and H. received their dividend, and there-
upon assumed and equally paid the note on which they were sureties;
whereupon K. executed his note to the plaintiff, on six months, for the
amount the plaintiff had paid as such surety, less said dividend : Hebl,
that tie plaintiff's claim upon the note was not discharged, and that tile
defendant was liable to him upon it: Pinney v. Kingston, 46 Vt.
DOMESTIC ANIMALS. See Fences.
EJECTMENT."
Plaintiff's Title at Time of Issue of Writ-Subsequent Acquisition of
Title by Defendant- United States Land Office Certificate-Former Ad-
judication-Under our practice, plaintiff in ejectment is only required
to show that the title and right of possession was in him at the commence.
nent of the action. A general denial, therefore, puts in issue, and the
judgment determines, the title and right of possession only with refer-
ence to that time: McLane v. Bovey, 34 Wis.
Under a general denial in ejeetment, defendant cannot introduce evi-
dence of facts which have occurred since the commencement of the
action, by virtue of which plaintiff has lost and defendant has ac-
quired title to the land: i.
In such a case the courtmay, at its discretion, grant leave to defendant,
on his application therefor, to set up such facts by supplemental com-
plaint. Tay. Stats.. 1447, § 45 : Id.
If leave for that purpose is not asked or granted, the Judgment for
plaintiff does not bar a subsequent action by the defendant to assert.the
title so acquired by him after the commencement of the fbrmer action
Id.
The person named in a certificate of entry of land at a U. S. land office,
or his assignee or grantee, has "a valid subsisting interest" in the land, to
which the right of possession is incident, and may maintain ejeetment
therefor: Id.
But the estate thus created is at most a determinablefee. liable, under
the laws of the United States, to be terminated by the act of the commis-
sioner of the general land office cancelling the certificate for cause at any
time before the issue of a patent: 11.
Where a ceFtificate is thus cancelled, the title revests in the United
States, which may allow the land to be entered by, and a patent to be
issued to, another.person: Id.
X., the grantee of M., who had entered land and obtained a certificate
of such entry, brought ejeetment for the land against Y., who answered
only by a general denial. During the pendency of the action, the coin-
missioner of the general land office, fbr cause, cancelled the certificate
of entry issued to M., and Y. was permitted by Act of Congress to pur-
chase and enter the land, and did so, and received a certificate of such
entry. On trial of the action of ejeetment under the original plead-
ing, the court refused to receive Y.'s certificate in evidence, and X. had
a verdict and judgment that he was seised of an estate in fee, of the
land and had the right of possession. Afterwards the land was patented
to Y. and he brought ejectment against X. therefor. Held, that the act io
was not barred by the former judgment: Id.
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* ELECTION. See Will.
EQUITY. See Will.
ESTOPPEL. See Frauds, Statute of.
t EVIDENCE. See Railroad.
Traditionary Evidence of Boundary.-One of the conditions uplz
which the declarations of deceased persons in relation to the location of
boundary lines and monuments are received in evidence, is, that it shall
be shown that they had knowledge of such lines and monuments at. tie
time of making the declarations to be proved. But such knowledge
cannot be shown by what they said: it must be proved by other means:
Hadley v. Howe, 46 Vt.
Copies of U. S. Department Records.-Congress may prescribe the
manner in which copies of the records ,f any department of the federal
government may be authenticated: XcLane v. Bocee and another, 84
Wis.
A certificate of the commissioner of" the general land office, signed by
him and sealed with his official seal, attached to what purported to be
copies of certain records of said office, and stating that -- the annexed
copies are true and literal exemplifications from the records and files of
this office," held to be sufficient to render such copies admissible in evi-
dence in the courts of this state. Laws of U. S. 1812, eb. 68 (2 U. S.
Stats. at Large, p. 716) : 1d.
Receipt-BParol Evidence to explzin-Revenue. Collector's Receipt.-
A receipt which does not constitute or import a contract, does not pre-
clude parol evidence of the purpose for which it was given; and parol
evidence is admissible to prove a contract made at the time of the exe-
cution of such receipt, and a part of the same transactinu : Randall v.
Kelsey, 46 Vt.
The plaintiff introduced in evidence a paper, to show the assessment
of an internal revenue tax by an assistant assessor. Held, the paper
not being produced in the Supreme Court, that it could not be assumed
that it was not a proper instrument of evidence to show the assess-
ment: Id.
An internal revenue collector's receipt is proper evidence to show
payment of the tax receipted: Z.
FENCES.. See.,ovenant.
Railroad-Animals at Large-Neglgence of Owners.-Enclosures
of railroads, as required by the Act of March 25th 1859 (S. & C. 331),
must be separate and distinct ftomn the enclosures of adjoining proprie-
tors: Marietta and Cinchinati Railroad Co. v. Stephenson, 24 Ohio St.
The obligation to construct and maintain fences upon both sides of
railroads, imposed by that act upon railroad companies, is not limited to
owners and occupiers of adjoining lands, but extends to the public gen-
erally : Id. %
The rule of the English common law, which requires the owners of
domestic animals to restrain them from running at large, has never been-
adopted or recognised as the common law of Ohio : Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
The owner of such animals running at large is not guilty of a breach
of any duty imposed upon him by the Act of April 13th 1865 (S. & S.
7), if they be at large without the omission on his part of reasonable
care: Id.
Where cattle running at large, without the fault of the owner, enter
the enclosed field of another person, through which a railroad passes,
and thence go upon the track of the road by reason of the want of fences
which it was the duty of the railroad company to have constructed so as
to separate the railroad from the adjacent lands, such owner is not
guilty, under the Act of April 7th 1865 (S. & S. 373), of contributing,
by his own wrong. to an injury done by a passing train to his cattle
while upon the railroad: Id.
Partition Fence-Action for half expense of.-In an action brought
under the Act of May 3d 1859 (S. & C. 81, 648), to recover one-half the
value of a partition fetce, the appraisal of the township trustees duly
made, in pursuance of the provisions of the act, is, unless impeached for
mistake or fraud, conclusive with respect to value, and of the fact that
the fence, in character and quality, meets the requirements of the stat-
ute; but such appraisal is not evidence of any other fact: Robb v.
Brachmann, 24 Ohio St.
The plaintiff in such action is not precluded from recovering, by the
fact that the fence is a better or more expensive one that would have sat-
isfied the requirements of the statute : Id.
Nor does the fact that the fence does not conform to the boundary line
between the lands of the respective parties necessarily constitute a de-
fence to such action. It is sufficient upon this point if it was constructed
and maintained as and for such line fence, and was recognised and ac-
quiesced in as such by the defendant: Id.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See .jectment.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OP. See Vendor and Purchaser.
.Evidence.-Contracts within the Statute of Frauds are not illegal
unless put in writing, but only not capable of being enforced against
the defendant without writing; an immunity which the defendant may
waive. Hence, when parol evidence of such a contract was given by
the plaintiff, without objection by the defendant at the time it was of-
fered, and not until the testimony was closed and the arguments to the
jury had commenced, it was held, that the defendant had waived his
right to object to the testimony: Montgomery v. Edwards, 46 Vt.
Promise vot within-Estoppel.-The plaintiff, as administrator of
an estate, delivered all the assets of the estate in his hands to the de-
fendant, in consideration of the defendant's parol promise to pay all
claims that might thereafter arise against the plaintiff as such adminis-
trator. Held, that the defendant's promise was not within the Statute
of Frauds: Randall v. Kelsey, 46 Vt.
He afterwards made claim against the plaintiff as such administrator;
and the testimony showed that it was at least questionable whether the
plaintiff was not bound to pay it. The defendant, being notified of said
claim, promised the plaintiff to take care of it, if sued, and was after-
wards notified of the suit that was brought against the plaintiff upon
.650
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it, but neglected to attend to it, and judgment was rendered therein
against the plaintiff, which he was compelled to pay. The testimony
also tended to show that said claim was one the estate ought to pay, and
that. the defendant once recognised it, by promising to pay part of it
to H. field, in a suit by the plaintiff to recover the amount paid by
him on said judgment, that the defendant was precluded from objecting
that said claim was not against the plaintiff as such administrator: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Will.
INSURANCE.
Waiver of Proof of Loss- Unintentional Error in Proof-Responsi-
bility of Insurer for Acts done by iis Agent in Name of Insured.-
Where the insurer, after a loss and before the time for furnishing proofs
thereof has expired, denies all liability entirely upon other grounds than
the want of such proofs (such as, that a subsequent policy had been
taken without the consent of such insurer, and that there was an over
insurance and the loss was fully covered by prior policies), this is a
waicer of the condition requiring proofs of loss to be made: McBride
v. ins. Co. (30 Wis. 562), and other cases in this court: Smith v.
Afnqzon Ins. Co., 34 Wis.*
A question in the form of application for a policy'rdlaed to the
ownership of the property; and that part of the application was filled
in by the local ogent of the insurer, on his own knowledge, and without
consultation with the assured. Hed, that a mistake in naming the
owners was the mistake of the insurer, and cannot defeat the policy, al-
though the application is therein referred to as a part of the contract,
and a warranty by the assured: Id.
The policy referred to an application No. 9719, and there was no ap-
plication sonumbered, but one was offered in evidence by the insurer
numbered 9716, purporting to be made by plaintiff, for insurance on the
property described in the policy, and in this the agent had made the
erroneous entry above described as to the names of the owners of said
property. The agent was asked by defendant on the trial whether the
policy was issued on this gpplication, for the purpose of showing a false
representation in regard to the ownership. Held, that the testimony
was properly rejected : Id.
.An unintentional mistake in the proofs of loss will not prevent a re-
covery upon the policy. So held where the proofs were made out by
the insurer, and stated incorrectly the names of the owners of the pro-
perty, and there was evidence that one of the firm insured signed the
same in haste, without knowledge of the error: Id.
JUDGMENT.
Clerical Error-Power of Court to Correct.-In a common-law action
to recover damages for thelowage of plaintiff's land by a'daii crosi a
navigable stream, and also to have the dam abated, the court held (as
shown by its minutes) that after a specified date the dam was a lawful
structure (under an act of the legislature), and that plaintiff could re-
cover in this action only for damages prior to that date, and must sue
under the mill-dam law for subsequent damages. The clerk, after the
term, entered judgment not only for the damages assessed by the jury,
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but also for the abatement of the dam. At the next term the court
vacated the latter portion of the judgment. Held,
1. That the judgment must properly be considered as entered during
the term at which the cause was tried :
2. That at a subsequent tern the court could not review thejwulment
on the merits, or correct its own errors ; but it might correct the jfdq-
ment so as to make the same conform to its previous decision :
3. That the ruling of the court, shown by the minutes, was equivalent
to a certificate, not only "that the removal of the dam was unnecessary"
(R. S. ch. 144, sec. 1), but that its abatement was unlawful; and there
was no error in the order correcting the judgment: Durning v. B rk-
Aardt, 31 Wis.
MUNICIPAL BONDS.
Act authorizing People of a Town to decide whether to subscribe
its Bonds in aid of Railroad-Suits on such Bonds-Coupons.-There
being nothing in the Constitution of the state of New York which makes
unconstitutional an act of the legislature authorizing the people of a
town to decide whether they will donate its bonds to a railroad company,
and collect taxes for the amount, such an act (the same being enabling
merely and not mandatory) is binding: Town of Qieensbury v. Culver,
19 WalL
Where a town, issuing bonds to which coupons or interest warrants
are -attached, acknowledges, in -the body of the bond, that the town is
indebted to the bearer or his assigns in such a sum of money, payable
at a future day named, "with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent.,
on presentation and delivery of the coupons for the same thereto attach-
ed," i! may be sued on the coupons alone, though they may have been
issued by commissioners specially made agents of the town by the legis-
lature, and by it charged with the matter of issuing the securities, and
not made by the ordinary town -authorities: Id.
This liability of the town is not taken away by the fact that the legis-
lature has directed a special mode in which the money to pay the prin-
cipal and interest of the bonds is to be raised ; the directions being given
to the town and county agents, and not to the holders of the bonds or
coupons: Id.
An act empowered commissioners to dispose of certain town bonds
(whose issue for the benefit of a iailroad company named, the act author-
ized), "to such persons or corporation and upon such terms as the com-
missioners should deem most advantageous for the town, but not for less
than par ;" and to "donate the money whichl should be so raised to the
railroad company." The act, however, required that they should not
"pay over any money or bonds" except upon certain conditions specified.
The comu issioners did not sell the bonds, but handed them over to the
railroad compahy in discharge of the authorized donation. On suit
against the town by a bonO fide holder of the bonds, held, that there
was no violation of the act by the commissioners in what they had done:
rd.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Negliece
Clhange of Street Grade-Damages to Owners.-The charter of Mil-
waukee (ch. 10, sec. 18) declares that where lthe grade of a street, once
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established, is afterwards chang d, "all damages, costs and charges
arising therefrom shall be paid by the city *to the owner of any lot, or
parcel of land, or tenement, which may be affected or injured" in con-
sequence of such alteration. Heid,
1. That the right to damages in such a case is purely statutory:
2. That the statute grants such damnages only to the owner of the
land or building injured, and only fur ihjuries to the land or built.a
itself, and costs or charges necessary to restore the same to their fornii.,"
relative condition and usefulness; and vot for injury to or suspensi.a
of the trade carried on upon the premises :
3. That in an action under said charter for damages to mill property
in consequence of a change in the established grade of a street, it was
error to include in the judgment for damages a sum awarded by the jury
" on account of the lss of the use of the mill during the raising and
adapting of the same to the new grade :" Stadler and another v. Wil.
waukee, 34 Wis.
NEGLIGENCE. See Fences.
Town-Pavements covered with Snow.-Under ch. 343, Laws of 1864
(Tay. Stats. 487, § 45), it is the duty of each overseer of highways,
whenever any portion of the highways in his district is rendered imp as-
sable by snow-drifts, " to call out, upon one day's notice, the tax-payers
of said district, and immediately put said part or parts of said highways
in passable order :" cCabe v. The Town of Hammond, 34 Wis.
*After a heavy fall of snow, accompanied by high wind, in any district,
the overseer therein is chargeable with zotice of the probable effects of
such storm, and it is his duty to ascertain where the highways are ob-
structed by snow, and take steps to remove the drifts : .d.
In an action for jiiuries received by plaintiff in consequence of the
highway being obstructed by a snow-drift, it appeared that the drift form-
ed on Tuesday, that the wind continued to drift the snow on Wednesday,
that it snowed again Thursday morning, though the wind had fallen, and
that the accident occurred on Friday forenoon. Eeld, that the town was
not chargeable with neghqence, nor liable in the action, unless, in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care and diligence by the overseer in giving notice
to ta'-payers, the drift could have been removed before plaintiff was in-
jured; and this was a questionfor thejury to determine from all the cir-
cumstances : Id.
It was error, therefore, to instruct the jury that the town would not
"be relieved from its liability by showing ordinary care:" Id.
OFFICER.
Usurpation-Criminal Intent.-An officer legally appointed and qual-
ined, continuing to act as such officer after the expiration of his term,
in good faith, reasonably believing it to be his duty to discharge the
duties of the office until his successor is qualified, is not to be regarded
as criminally usurping the office, within the meaning of section 13 of
the Act of March 8th 1831, "for the punishment of certain offences
therein named." Kreidler v. The State, 24 Ohio St.
PLEADING. SeeAetion; Trepas.
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RAILROAD. See Fences.
Deed by President-Purchase f Land by- Ultra Vires.-A deed, pur-
porting to have been executed by the president of a railroad corporation,
under the seal of the corporation, as authorized by section 15 of the Act
of May Ist 1852 (S. & C. 279), if objected to, cannot be given in evi-
dence without proof of its execution: W'ald v. Burton, 24 Ohio St.
The power to purchase land, conferred upon a railroad company by
section 14 of the Act of February l1th 1848 (S. & C. 273, note), is
not limited to the acquisition of such lands as may be necessary fi,r op-
erating or maintaining its road: Id.
If, in making a purchase of real estate, the company abuse the power
conferred upon it by said section, still, after resale and conveyance, the
title becomes indefeasible in the hands of its vendee: Id.
A mortgage executed by a railroad company on " the road" of the
company, "whether made or to be made, acquired or to be acquired,
and all property, real or personal," of the company, "whether now
owned or hereafter to be acquired, used or appropriated for the operating
or maintaining the said road," is not a lien upon real estate of the com-
pany, then owned or afterward acquired, which has not been used or
appropriated for operating or maintaining the ! road: Id.
REoEIPr. See Evidece.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See Vendor and Purchaser.
STREET. See Municipal Corporation.
SURETY. See Debtor and Creditor.
"TOWN. See Negligence.
TRESPASS.
Pleading.--New Assignme.-In trespass Iquare clausum, when the
declaration only counts upon a single act of trespass, which is justified
by plea, the plaintiff cannot in his replication traverse the matter of
justification, and also new assign the same or different acts of trespass:
Spencer v. Bemis, 46 Vt.
UNITED STATES COURTS.
Practice-Submission of Case without a JuryT -Revtew in such case.-
The case of Folsom v. Insurance Com any, 18 Wallace 237, and the
numerous cases there cited, p. 244, affirmed, and the doctrine again de-
clared, that where a jury is waived and the issues of fact submitted to
the Circuit Court, under the Act of March 3d 1865 (quoted in the
report of the case cited, p. 238), this court will not review the finding
of the court where it is general and unaccompanied by any authorized
statement of facts; and that in the case of such general finding, "no-
thing is open to review by the losing party under a writ of error except
the rulings of the Circuit Court in the progIess of the trial, and that
the phrase, ' rulings of the court in the progress of the trial,' does not -
include the general finding of the Circuit Court nor the conclusions of
the Circuit Court embodied in such general finding :" Cooper, Executor.
v. Omohundro, 19 Wall.
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Practice.-The doctrine of the preceding case reaffirmed. Declared
further, and in explanation, that a mere report of the evidence is not
such a special finding or authorized statement of the case as will allow
this court to pass upon the judgment given: Crews v. Brewer, 19 Wall.
Jurisdiction-Averment of Citizenship of Parties.-When a citizen
of one state as endorsee of inland bills, drawn or accepted by a citizen of
another-the plaintiff claiming through the endorsement of the payee,
or of the payee and subsequent endorsers-sues the drawer or acceptor,
in the Circuit Court, the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act requires
that the citizenship of such payee, or of such payee and subsequent endor-
sers, be alleged to be different from that of the defendant. It is not
enough to allege that the plaintiff is a citizen of one state, and the defend-
ant of another: Morgan's Executor v. Gay, 19 Wall.
It is not competent for a Circuit Court. to determine, without the in-
tervention of a jury, an issue of fhct in the absence of the counsel of
the party and without any written agreement to waive a trial by jury:
Id.
UNITED STATES LAND OFFICE. See .lectment; Evidence.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Covenant.
Statute of Frauds-Specific Performance-Encumbrance- Title.-
Where the name of the agent, with whom a contract for the purchase
of real estate was made, appears in the written memorandum of the
agreement signed by the purchaser, who is the party to be charged, the
Statute of Frauds is satisfied, although the names of the principals are
not disclosed therein: Walsh v. Barton et al, 24 Ohio St.
When a vendor of land, having contracted to convey a perfect title,
brings his action to compel specific performance against the vendee, who
denies the sufficiency of the vendor's title, the burden of showing title
in himself rests on the plaintiff, and the introduction of a deed of recent
date executed to himself, without further proof of title, is not sufficient:
Id.
A purchaser of land, who is entitled under his contract to a perfect
title, cannot be compelled to perform his agreement, if the property
purchased be subject to a judgment lien, unless he can be protected by
the decree from loss or inconvenience by reason of the lien, although
it be shown that the judgment-debtor has other property sufficient to
satisfy the judgment: Id.
WILL.
Election- Presumption of Intention-Equity-Husbond and Wfe.-
Where a will assumes to give to one of its beneficiaries property of an-
other person for whom provision is likewise made in the will, the latter
cannot take the provision made for him in the will, and also hold the
property, but imust elect which lie will take: luston v. Cone, 24 Ohio
St.
In order to put the party to such election, it mustplainly appear that
it was not the intention of the testator to give him the provision made in
the will in addition to the property, except where the property in ques-
tion is the widow's right of dower, as to which the rule has been reversed
by statutory provision : Md.
